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ABSTRACT 
For over a century, anti-trust law has been used to main-
tain an open and fair market economy by preventing monopo-
lies.1 However, anti-trust law has never precisely defined the 
term “monopoly”, which makes evaluating the interactions be-
tween the prohibition of monopoly and encouraging competition 
increasingly challenging.2
In 2006, the Hong Kong Government appointed Arculli & 
Associates Solicitor Firm to study issues relating to competi-
tion in the auto-fuel retail market in Hong Kong.
 
3
                                                 
1 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 54 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 A test based 
on contribution margins was recommended, leading to the con-
2 Id. at 59. 
3 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG SAR 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PAPER LC Paper No. CB(1)1303/05-
06(03) (2006) (H.K.).  
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clusion that price fixing is not a crime in the industry.4
This article examines the problems related to Arculli & As-
sociates Solicitor Firm’s conclusion. First, price fixing is a per 
se violation (in or by itself) of the anti-trust law in the United 
States. Second, it is difficult for the courts to evaluate price fix-
ing because the evidence of such activities between corpora-
tions is not easily available. Third, the test has applied non-
standardized accounting principles, which clash with the ac-
counting industry on numerous grounds. 
 
To combat these problems, this paper proposes a revised 
and objective “Contribution Margin” test to measure monopo-
lies. Based on general accounting principles, this paper 
presents a comparative study of contribution margins between 
listed companies in the United States and Hong Kong. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Hong Kong government has long taken on a non-
interventionist policy towards the Hong Kong economy, contri-
buting to the limited legal restrictions on the marketplace.5 
This laxity, however, began to change with the handover of so-
vereignty in July 1997.6 The last decade has seen a series of 
debates, involving both the government and the public, on the 
competitive economic environment of Hong Kong.7 In response, 
the government has appointed Arculli & Associates Solicitor 
Firm as a consultant on issues related to the auto-fuel retail 
market in Hong Kong.8
                                                 
4 MOTTA, supra note 1, at 73.  
 The firm presented the results of their 
5 Milton Friedman, Hong Kong Wrong, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2006, at A2, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116009800068684505.html?-
mod=opinion_main_commentaries.  
6 Id. 
7 See THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MEETING, 
UPDATED BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A CROSS-
SECTOR COMPETITION LAW IN HONG KONG, LC Paper No. CB(1)372/08-
09(04), 1-12 (2008) (H.K.). 
8 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTO-
FUEL RETAIL MARKET 3 (2006) (H.K.). 
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study in the Arculli & Associates Report (Arculli Report),9 
which was provided by the Economic Development and Labour 
Bureau for use as a reference document at the Meeting of 
Competition Policy in Hong Kong, hosted by the Panel of Eco-
nomic Service of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.10 In 2008, 
having received positive feedback from the public, the Hong 
Kong government introduced a bill in competition law to the 
Hong Kong Legislation Council (HK Legco) at the Panel on 
Economic Development Meeting.11
According to the United States approach, which maintains 
that price fixing is a per se violation of anti-trust law, the lead-
ing oil companies in Hong Kong would have indeed violated the 
law with their price fixing activities, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co.,. However, the difference between 
these two jurisdictions stems from the legislation that set the 
criteria to evaluate monopolistic powers objectively. Neverthe-
less, both the United States and Hong Kong tests have their 
inherent problems when enforcing anti-trust law. Thus, the Ar-
culli Report introduces a “Contribution Margin” test, based on 
accepted general accounting principles, with the aim of reduc-
ing legislative discretion in these cases.
 
12
This article consists of three parts. The first discusses the 
background of the Hong Kong Competition Legislation together 
with a consultation paper supported by the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment. The second part examines the information gathered 
from the literature review. Based on the contribution margin 
analysis - a method widely used in managerial accounting - the 
last section recommends a model that identifies the competi-
 
                                                 
9 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL PAPER LC PAPER No. CB(1)1303/05-06(03), (2006) (H.K.). 
10 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HONG KONG 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AGENT FOR THE MEETING ON FEB. 24, 2009 (H.K.). 
11 THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
PANEL ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MEETING, UPDATED BACKGROUND 
BRIEF ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A CROSS-SECTOR COMPETITION LAW IN 
HONG KONG, LC Paper No. CB(1)372/08-09(04), 1-12 (2008) (H.K.). 
12 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTO-
FUEL RETAIL MARKET 4 (2006). 
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tion stage of a company or an industry in the market. 
II.  WEAKNESSES OF THE MEASUREMENT IN THE ARCULLI & 
ASSOCIATES’ REPORT AND OTHER INDICATORS  
A.  Gross Margin Analysis in The Arculli & Associates’ Report 
The Arculli Report, titled the “Study of the Auto-Fuel Re-
tail Market,” was prepared by the Economic Development and 
Labour Bureau (EDL Bureau).13
The first conclusion of the Arculli Report states that there 
is “no clear evidence of collusion by oil companies in the Hong 
Kong auto-fuel retail market,”
 It focuses on how the govern-
ment determines the scope of monopolistic activities under 
competition law legislation. It is regarded as a foundational 
source in discussions of competition law legislation. 
14 a conclusion highly dependent 
on Section 1 of the US Sherman Act. The report performs a 
profit analysis (see Table 4.1), which shows that the contribu-
tion margin of the oil companies is relatively high on an inter-
national scale. The report explains this result by taking note of 
high land costs and concludes that the relatively high gross 
margins in Hong Kong still fall within a reasonable range.15 
However, it should be noted that in marginal accounting prac-
tice, other operating costs are not usually taken into account.16
There are two obvious loopholes in the report. First, a suf-
ficiently high profit and gross margin, though not the sole indi-
cators, are suitable criteria to measure whether a company is a 
monopoly.
 
17 Pun-Lee Lam and Sylvia Chan in their book Com-
petition in Hong Kong’s Gas Industry,18
                                                 
13 Id. at 3. 
 use the example of the 
gas industry to outline the framework of the competition envi-
ronment in Hong Kong. Unlike the petroleum industry, the 
14 Id. at 22. 
15 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTO-
FUEL RETAIL MARKET 45 (2006). 
16 See infra Part 4.1. 
17 PUN-LEE LAM & SYLVIA CHAN, COMPETITION IN HONG KONG’S GAS 
INDUSTRY 19 (Chinese Univ. Press 2000). 
18 Id. 
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Hong Kong and China Gas Company Limited (HKCG) is the 
only gas supplier in Hong Kong,19 although it faces indirect 
competition from electricity companies in the domestic energy 
market.20 Lam and Chan compare the stock price of HKSC 
with the Hang Seng Index—the leading Hong Kong stock mar-
ket indicator - between 1982 and 1997.21 The authors demon-
strate that the contribution margin of the company rose consis-
tently between 1973 and 1996 due to government intervention, 
which contributes to the consolidation of monopolistic power.22 
However, comparisons of stock prices may not be the most ef-
fective strategy to prove the existence of predatory market be-
havior because stock prices can be affected by a series of non-
operating factors. On the other hand, an increase in contribu-
tion margin to improve operation profit has always been a 
strong indicator of a monopoly in the market.23
As for the second loophole, it should be noted that high 
selling prices are not caused by high land costs, but by inves-
tors who are willing to pay high prices because of investment 
opportunities.
 
24 The Arculli Report claims that the high selling 
price of petrol in Hong Kong is caused by the high land cost,25 
but this claim contradicts economist David Ricardo’s argument 
in his book: On the Principle of Political Economy and Taxa-
tion.26 Ricardo writes that, in the example of land and corn 
production, high corn prices are not the result of high land 
prices, but that land prices are a result of the predicted profits 
that sellers want to gain from the production of corn.27
                                                 
19 Id. at xvii-xxv. 
 The 
purchasers of factors of production, such as land, are willing to 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 MOTTA, supra note 1, at 27. 
24 See generally David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/lib-
rary/Ricardo/ricP1a.html#Ch.2,%20On%20Rent (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).  
25 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTO-
FUEL RETAIL MARKET 9, 12-13 (2006). 
26 Ricardo, supra note 24, at ch. 2. 
27 Id. 
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spend more because the expected profit is high.28
Besides these two loopholes, the biggest problems in the 
report are the misuse of accounting concepts to interpret law 
and the faulty application of cases to legal issues. As a precise 
definition of “monopoly” in competition law legislation and a 
spectrum of anti-competitive behaviors are essential to this le-
gal reform, the legal and accounting point of views shall be re-
examined in the following two sections. 
 In other 
words, rent would not have been high if no one had made use of 
these production factors for profit. In light of Ricardo’s explana-
tion, the argument of the Arculli Report is simply not feasible. 
B. Weaknesses of Other Indictors 
Share price is the most common indicator reflecting a com-
pany’s profitability.29 In their analysis of the town gas industry 
in Hong Kong, Pun-Lee Lam and Sylvia Chan compare the 
high return of the Hong Kong and China Gas Limited to the 
Hang Seng Index, the major stock market of Hong Kong.30 The 
authors use share price as an indicator because it is regarded 
as one of the major elements of equity return.31 In the long run, 
the share price reflects the profitability of a company, except in 
the case when share options are awarded to senior manage-
ment. In past decades, some scholars suggested that when the 
interests of owners (the principals who own the companies) and 
managers (the agents who run the business) are different, 
share options might bind the interests of the two.32
Theoretically, including share options as a portion of re-
muneration binds managers’ interests to the owners’; the man-
agers would, in this case, have a vested interest in maximizing 
company profit and, thereby, the share price they own. Howev-
er, this assumption does not work in practice because the man-
agers may exercise their options and cash their shares after 
 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 LAM & CHAN, supra note 17, at 22. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 20. 
32 See generally Michael C. Jensen &William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). 
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they have resigned. The grantees therefore tend to enter into a 
contract that provides them with short-term profits, but that 
affects the company negatively in the long run.33
The impact of the sub-prime mortgage crisis on the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) speaks for itself; 
by the end of the fiscal year 2008, HSBC had suffered from a 
high bad-debt provision, which was the main reason for the 
nearly 70% drop in net profits.
 
34 Although the current senior 
management gave up their bonuses due to unsatisfactory per-
formance, John Bond, the former chairperson who was respon-
sible for taking the company into this high-risk market, was 
not affected by the bonus reduction because he retired in 
2006.35 Although some companies prohibit managers from ex-
ercising such a practice for a period after their resignations, 
such as the third-year period introduced by the China Life In-
surance Co. Ltd. in 2006,36
Furthermore, share price is not a reliable criterion in legal 
tests because it is easily affected by external factors. A good 
example of this issue is the result of a claim made by the Chi-
nese media on August 2, 2007.
 a company’s share price may still 
not be a reliable indicator of its profitability. 
37 The media claimed that the 
Chinese government would soon confirm the “Qualified Domes-
tic Institutional Investor (QDII)” scheme, which allowed indi-
viduals in China to invest in the Hong Kong stock market.38
                                                 
33 Jennifer N. Carpenter, Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial 
Risk Appetite? (NYU Working Paper No. FIN-98-016), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296411. 
 
34 Summary Consolidated Income Statement, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 
ANNUAL REV. 2008, http://www.2008.annualreview.hsbc.com/financial_state-
ments/consolidated_income_statement.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
35 Historical Highest Provision of HSBC after Sub-prime Storm, CHINA 
REV. NEWS, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1005/8/2/8/100582-
895.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100582895 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
36 China Life Insurance Co., Ltd. Designs Its Share Option Reward 
Scheme, THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://jingyuan.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zhongyaozt/200611/20061103767944.h
tml (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
37 The First QDII Authorized Agent is Appointed, H.K. ECON. J., Aug. 2, 
2007, at P11. 
38 Id. 
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Following this announcement, the Hang Seng Index raised 
from 22,443.25 on August 2, 2007 to 31,492.88 on November 1, 
2007, 39 the historical peak at closing. However, two days later, 
Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the People's Republic of China, an-
nounced that the scheme was not to be put in place.40 A year 
after Wen’s announcement, the Index plummeted to 14,344.37 
on November 3, 2008.41
All the same, net profits alone are not a good indicator be-
cause they too can be affected by a range of tangential factors, 
like, as Chicago scholars suggest, high performance.
 The proposed scheme has been left 
hanging until the present day, and the share market in Hong 
Kong has experienced fluctuations. Although the shares re-
turned to equilibrium after Wen’s announcement, fluctuation 
indicates how unreliable share prices can be as an indicator for 
a legal test. 
42 For ex-
ample, the profits made from food and beverages sold in gas 
stations affect the total income of the petroleum company. 
However, this income is not relevant to petrol sales and the 
contribution margin analysis only concentrates on the profita-
bility of the quantity of petrol sold. Compared with the Lerner 
Index,43 contribution margins focus more on the corporatation 
itself, when the former may be affected by the special nature of 
a product sold or the demand elasticity of customers.44
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARCULLI & ASSOCIATES’ REPORT 
IN US SHERMAN ACT 
 
In addition to its use of non-standardized accounting con-
cepts, the Arculli Report does not fully present and discuss re-
levant cases of price fixing before it jumps to the conclusion 
                                                 
39 YAHOO! FIN. H.K., http://hk.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 1, 
2010). 
40 Wen Jiabao: The QDII Scheme shall not Affects Stability of the Stock 
Market, H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, (Nov. 3, 2008), http://sc.info.gov.hk/-
gb/www.news.gov.hk/tc/category/businessandfinance/071103/html/071103tc03
003.htm. 
41 YAHOO! FIN. H.K., http://hk.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 1, 
2010). 
42 MOTTA, supra note 1, at 78. 
43 Id. at 110. 
44 Id. at 111. 
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that price fixing in the petroleum industry is not a crime. 
Above all, it merely refers to a series of cases held by the Unite 
States Court of Appeal to cite opinions about individual issues 
of price fixing. It makes no mention of the leading case, Dr. 
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., in which the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that price fixing is a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act.45
United States legislation contains a series of statutes con-
cerning anti-trust law, such as the Sherman Act, the Clayton 
Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.
 Furthermore, the United States 
Supreme Court price fixing case, State Oil Co. v. Khan, must be 
addressed for an in-depth and well-rounded discussion of the 
topic. A discussion of price fixing that is based on cases from 
the lower courts of the United States and neglects the judg-
ments of two major Supreme Court cases is simply insufficient. 
46 As an international law, the Sherman Act was first 
referred to in the Arculli Report to determine whether the pe-
troleum industry in Hong Kong fits into the scope of interna-
tional competition law.47
A.  Relevant Sections of US Sherman Act 
 
The Competition Policy Review Committee, under the 
Competition Policy Advise Group, refers to the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, a prominent statute in the United States, as one of 
the foreign authorities for its overseas practice section.48 Sec-
tions 1 and 2 are the major sections in the Sherman Act be-
cause they outline the scope of international competition law.49
                                                 
45 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2011). 
 
Section 2 is entitled Trusts, etc., in Restraint of Illegal Trade; 
46 Donald S. Clark, The Robinson-Patman Act: General Principles, Com-
mission Proceedings, and Selected Issues, F.T.C., http://www.ftc.gov/-
speeches/other/patman.shtm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
47 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTO-
FUEL RETAIL MARKET 62 (2006). 
48 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS: 
PEARSON INTERNATIONAL EDITION 384 (7th ed. 2009). 
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2011). 
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Penalty. It states that: 
[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combina-
tion or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, 
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.50
According to the decision United States v Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass’n, if a group of entities intentionally form a cartel 
to fix prices, then they have violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.
 
51 However, this scenario is unlikely because companies 
would recognize that any written agreement between them to 
fix prices would openly break the law. Thus, the authorities 
must use circumstantial evidence to determine whether there 
are any monopolistic activities in practice, such as oligopolistic 
industries being dominated by a few firms. The act itself does 
not explicitly define what types of agreements constitute a suf-
ficient concert to form a “contract, combination or conspira-
cy.”52
B.  Price Fixing Issue in the Arculli & Associates’ Report 
 The analysis of Arculli’s Report attempts to classifying 
the issue of whether such an agreement exists, however, is un-
likely completed for missing the leading cases above. 
The Arculli Report refers to three cases to determine 
whether the petroleum industry in Hong Kong falls under the 
scope of the Sherman Act.53
                                                 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 By referring to two cases in the 
United States Court of Appeal, the Report concludes that Unit-
ed States anti-trust law does not prohibit price fixing activi-
51 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
52 PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 202 (6th ed. 2004). 
53 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, STUDY OF THE AUTO-
FUEL RETAIL MARKET 62-63 (2006) [hereinafter HONG KONG SAR 
GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL RETAIL MARKET]. 
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ties.54 However, it is clear that lower courts (i.e., the Court of 
Appeals) hold less authority than the United States Supreme 
Court, the highest judiciary body of the country,55
C.  The Scope of Price Fixing Under Article 1 of the Sherman 
Act in the US Supreme Court 
 which classi-
fies price fixing as a per se violation of the Sherman Act, see 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.. 
In a country that operates under a common law legal sys-
tem, the decisions of the Supreme Court override the decisions 
of the lower courts.56
Between 1911 and 1997, the United States Supreme Court 
maintained the decision made in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v John 
D. Park & Sons, which maintains that price fixing is a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act.
 It is therefore illogical to bypass the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and focus on the opinions of a lower 
court, especially when the latter’s view is contrary to the pre-
vailing opinion of the Supreme Court. 
57
[T]he Dr. Miles Medical Company knows better than we do what 
will enable it to do the best business. We must assume its retail 
price to be reasonable, for it is so alleged and the case is here on 
demurrer; so I see nothing to warrant my assuming that the pub-
lic will not be served best by the company being allowed to carry 
out its plan. I cannot believe that in the long run the public will 
profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for 
some ulterior purpose of their own, and thus to impair, if not to 
destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to 
be desirable that the public should be able to get.
 In this decision, Justice Holmes 
affirms that any contracts made to maintain prices would vi-
olate the Sherman Antitrust Act, and comments on the issue of 
social benefits under any such agreement: 
58
The circumstances of the Dr. Miles case clearly differ from 
 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1 
56 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2011). 
57 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911). 
58 Id. 
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those of the Hong Kong petroleum industry. In the former, 
there was a written agreement presented by the plaintiff as a 
single entity of wholesalers and retailers; in the latter, there is 
no such document among the petroleum companies in Hong 
Kong. In spite of this difference, the case is still notable be-
cause it was the first decision made by the United States Su-
preme Court to enforce Section 1 of the Sherman Act regarding 
price maintenance.59
The United States Supreme Court’s stance on price fixing 
is further affirmed in the case: United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co.
 Therefore, it has relevance for the situa-
tion in Hong Kong. 
60
[U]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose 
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or sta-
bilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign com-
merce is illegal per se. Where the machinery for price-fixing is an 
agreement on the prices to be charged or paid for the commodity 
in the interstate or foreign channels of trade, the power to fix 
prices exists if the combination has control of a substantial part 
of the commerce in that commodity.
 When applying the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court 
states that: 
61
Further, Albrecht v. Herald Co., reaffirms the decision that 
price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
 
62 It states: 
“The question in this case is not whether dictation of maximum 
prices is ever illegal, but whether it is always illegal. Petitioner 
is seeking, and now receives, a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict of a jury that he had failed to show that the practice 
was unreasonable in this case.”63 However, the Supreme Court 
overruled Albrecht in State Oil Co. v. Khan, which divided the 
offense of price fixing into two categories: vertical and horizon-
tal maximum price fixing.64
                                                 
59 Jeffrey Bradford, The Antitrust News: “Resale price maintenance after 
Leegin,” ELLIS & WINTERS, http://www.elliswinters.com/?p=inside/5news/-
stories&story=antitrust_news_bradford_08 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 Because of this case, vertical price 
fixing is no longer considered a per se violation of the Sherman 
60 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940). 
61 Id. at 223. 
62 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
63 Id. at 880. 
64 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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Act, as Justice O’Connor states: 
[I]n overruling Albrecht, we of course do not hold that all vertical 
maximum price fixing is per se lawful. Instead, vertical maxi-
mum price fixing, like the majority of commercial arrangements 
subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the rule 
of reason. In our view, rule-of-reason analysis will effectively 
identify those a situation in which vertical maximum price fixing 
amounts to anticompetitive conduct.65
Although the concept of vertical price fixing in the State 
Oil case is no longer a per se violation of anti-trust law in the 
Unite States, the State Oil case provides a reasonable test to 
justify this legal rationale. Furthermore, after the State Oil 
case, horizontal price fixing is still considered a breach of the 
Sherman Act.
 
66
 1. New Development in the U.S. v LG Display Co., Ltd. and 
LG Display America, Inc. (2008), CR 08-0803 VRW. 
 The cases referred to in the Arculli Report are 
therefore unreliable because the opinions of the lower courts 
should not be relied upon when their views conflict with those 
of the Supreme Court. In the case of the Hong Kong petroleum 
industry, the per se violation will still be applicable if horizon-
tal price fixing is found in the retailing market. 
In 2008, the defendants of United States v LG Display Co., 
United States v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes, , and United States 
v. Sharp Corporation, agreed to pay a total sum of USD 585 
million to settle their prosecutions for price fixing.67 The fine 
paid by LG Display, USD 400 million,68 was the second largest 
amount awarded under the Sherman Act in history.69 For their 
part, Sharp Corporation paid USD 120 million,70
                                                 
65 Id. at 22. 
 representing 
66 Id. 
67 LG, Sharp, Chunghwa Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay Total of $585 Million 
in Fines for Participating in LCD Price-fixing Conspiracies, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-1002.html (last 
visit Apr. 12, 2011). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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the twelfth largest amount awarded under the Sherman Act.71 
Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd. paid USD 65 million,72 which is 
the second largest antitrust criminal fine in the history.73
In terms of law, however, LG Display may not be a leading 
case. First, the defendants were willing to pay the United 
States government before the court made the decision to end 
the litigation. Second, it was merely a case heard in the Unites 
States District Court for the Northern District of California. As 
mentioned earlier on, in the common law jurisdiction of the 
United States, a case heard in a district court may not have an 
effect on the whole country. Nevertheless, this case is referable 
not only for the huge amount paid by the defendants, but also 
for the nature of the case itself. Unlike the opinions made in 
the lower courts cases cited in the Arculli Report, the reasoning 
of the LG Display case matches the principles of the decision 
made by the United States Supreme Court, especially for the 
horizontal price model. Among other things, the case provides 
further information on what type of agreement violates the 
Sherman Act. 
 
The grounds that the United States Department of Justice 
prosecuted LG Display and Chunghwa for violation of the 
Sherman Act were described: 
  [F]rom on or about September 21, 2001 to on or about June 1, 
2006, the defendants and their coconspirators entered into and 
engaged in a combination and conspiracy in the United States 
and elsewhere to suppress and eliminate competition by fixing 
the prices of thin-film transistor liquid crystal display panels 
("TFT-LCD"). The combination and conspiracy engaged in by the 
defendants and their coconspirators was in unreasonable re-
straint of interstate and foreign trade and commerce in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).The charged com-
bination and conspiracy consisted of a continuing agreement, un-
derstanding, and concert of action among the defendants and 
their coconspirators, the substantial terms of which were to agree 
to fix the prices of TFT-LCD.74
                                                 
71 Id. 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See Indictment: United States of America v. Cheng Yuan Lin, a.k.a. 
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In examining these allegations, it is too vague for The Ar-
culli Report to merely emphasizes a “plus factor” when deter-
mining whether corporate agreements violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.75 In 2007, when the United States Supreme 
Court, decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly, it upheld the de-
cision in the Court of Appeals that: “[p]lus factors are not re-
quired to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on pa-
rallel conduct to survive dismissal.”76
D.  Horizontal Price Fixing in Hong Kong Oil Industry? 
 Moreover, this study for 
the settlement of LG Display case can be directly comparable to 
the HK Petroleum industry because in both cases, the they 
have been accused in court for price fixing activities with un-
reasonably high prices. 
Based on these findings, the next question that arises re-
volves around how the court determines whether price fixing 
exists. In its discussion of the United States Anti-Trust Act and 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Arculli Report emphasizes 
the existence of agreements by referring to lower court deci-
sions.77 However, as Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron 
S. Edlin remark, it is difficult to track written evidence of such 
agreements that would directly violate the Sherman Act.78 It 
almost goes without saying that “firms contemplating a con-
spiracy will conceal their tracks or attempt to achieve their 
goals more indirectly.”79 The Arculli Report simply concludes 
that “United States antitrust law does not prohibit oligopolists 
from pricing above competitive levels in the absence of an 
agreement to do so.”80
                                                                                                             
C.Y. Lin, Wen Jun Cheng, a.k.a. Tony Cheng, and Duk Mo Koo, No. CR 09-
0110 MMC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/-
atr/cases/f243500/243521.pdf. 
 In contrast, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kap-
75 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL 
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53, at 62. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 113-14 (6th ed. 2004). 
79 Id. at 202. 
80 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL 
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low, and Aaron S. Edlin contend that “oligopolists sometimes 
can achieve cartel-like results without any express agree-
ment.”81 They caution, “proving a conspiracy in restraint of 
trade often involves usual difficulties of interring the existence 
of an agreement from defendants’ behavior.”82
IV.  THE CONTRIBUTION MARGIN ANALYSIS OF THE ARCULLI & 
ASSOCIATES’ REPORT 
 
A.  Revenue 
The Arculli Report performs a gross margin (or contribu-
tion margin) analysis to evaluate whether the petroleum com-
panies in Hong Kong have earned unreasonably higher profits 
in comparison with companies in other countries by means of 
collusion or price fixing.83 This is a commonly used profit anal-
ysis for regular petrol and ULSD diesel sales in Hong Kong.84 
However, the Report’s method of calculating the percentage of 
contribution margin is not acceptable according to the Hong 
Kong Accounting Standard, the “Bible” of accounting principles 
in Hong Kong.85
Contribution margin (or profit margin) analysis is a useful 
tool for a company’s management team to evaluate financial 
performance and to make investment divisions. It is defined as, 
“the amount remaining from sales revenues after variable ex-
penses have been deducted.”
 
86
                                                                                                             
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53, at 62. 
 According to the Hong Kong Ac-
81 PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN supra note 78, 
at 20. 
82 Id. 
83 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL 
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53, at 16. 
84 See HONG KONG CONSUMER COUNCIL’S REPORT, http://www.con-
sumer.org.hk/website/wrap_en2/oil9811/chinese/report.htm, (last visit Apr. 4, 
2011). 
85 See Members' Handbook Volume II – “Financial Reporting Standards,” 
H.K. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (HKICPA), http://app1.hki-
cpa.org.hk/ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/contentpage.p
df. 
86 RAY H. GARRISON & ERIC W. NOREEN, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 
211 (8th ed. 2000). 
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counting Standard (HKAS), the Hong Kong version of the In-
ternational Accounting Standard (IAS)8788 “revenue” is defined 
as: “[t]he gross inflow of economic benefits during the period 
arising in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity 
when those inflows result in increases in equity, other than in-
creases relating to contributions from equity participants.”89
[T]he term “profits” in paragraph 1 of Article 1 is not defined in 
the Arrangement. Its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance 
with the laws of both Sides. In the Mainland, profits refer to all 
profits derived by an enterprise directly from its business activi-
ties. In Hong Kong, profits refer to the business profits derived by 
an enterprise and are computed in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles and the provisions of the IRO.
 
Although no definition is provided in the Inland Revenue Or-
dinance (IRO), the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department 
provides one in its Departmental Interpretation and Practice 
Notes (DIPN): 
90
Generally, the sales revenue is equal to the amount re-
ceived from the customer to the company. However, there is an 
exception when the company withholds part of the amount as a 
tax for the government.  
 
In paragraph 8, the HKAS 18 also states that: 
[R]evenue includes only the gross inflows of economic benefits re-
ceived and receivable by the entity on its own account. Amounts 
collected on behalf of third parties such as sales taxes, goods and 
services taxes and value added taxes are not economic benefits 
which flow to the entity and do not result in increases in equity. 
                                                 
87 Hong Kong Accounting Standard 18 Revenue, H.K. INST. OF CERTIFIED 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (HKICPA) ¶ 7 (Mar. 2010), http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/-
ebook/HKSA_Members_Handbook_Master/volumeII/hkas18.pdf. 
88 The IAS is used in more than 100 countries. See Press Release, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting 
Standards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily 
(Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
184.htm. 
89 Hong Kong Accounting Standard 18 Revenue, supra note 87, at ¶ 7. 
90 INLAND REVENUE DEP’T H.K., DEPARTMENTAL INTERPRETATION AND 
PRACTICE NOTES NO. 32, 10 (June 1998), available at http://www.ird.gov.hk/-
eng/pdf/e_dipn32.pdf. 
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Therefore, they are excluded from revenue.91
Under this principle, excises and duties received from custom-
ers in the oil companies should be excluded from calculations of 
revenue. HKAS 18 rejects the accounting method in the Arculli 
Report, which does not treat excises and duties as economic 
benefits contributing to the entities; instead, they are withheld 
by the petroleum companies for the government as part of their 
revenue. Excises and duties should not be treated as variable 
costs when the fund is actually held by the sellers as a trustee, 
rather than as an income statement item for calculating the 
contribution margin and net income. For this reason, in the Ar-
culli Report’s gross profit analysis, the revenue of petrol is 
overestimated because the sales amount received is actually 
not fully recorded as the revenue. If this misleading figure is 
eliminated, the sales of regular petrol and ULSD Diesel would 
not be HK$11.13 and HK$5.78 per liter, but HK$5.07 and 
HK$4.67 respectively (see Table 4.1 and 4.2). Although this ad-
justment does not affect the actual amount of the contribution 
margin, it could be highly misleading when conducting the con-
tribution margin analysis by percentage. 
 
                                                 
91 Members' Handbook Volume II, supra note 85, ¶ 8. 
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Table 4.1 - Contribution margin of Petrol Sales in Hong 
Kong Margin Analysis - (Year to 30 June 2005) Arculli & 
Associates’ Report Version92
 
 
  Regular Petrol 
 
ULSD Diesel 
HK$/ Per litre  HK$/ Per litre 
Pump Price 12.06   7.23  
Typical Discount (0.93)  (1.45) 
Price after Discounts 11.13   5.78  
Excise/ Duty (6.06)  (1.11) 
Product Cost (3.00)  (2.86) 
    
Gross Margin 2.07   1.81  
    
Land (1.02)  (1.02) 
Construction Costs (0.14)  (0.14) 
Operating Costs (0.36)  (0.36) 
Credit Card Commission (0.05)  (0.05) 
Government Rent and Rates (0.07)  (0.07) 
Terminal Storage (0.08)  (0.08) 
Distribution (0.06)  (0.06) 
    
Net Margin 0.29   0.02  
    
As & of Ex-Duty Pump Price 4.80%  0.30% 
As & of Ex-Duty Discounted 
Price 5.50%  0.50% 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 6. 
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Table 4.2 - Amended Contribution Margin of Petrol Sales 
in Hong Kong Margin Analysis - (Year to 30 June 2005)93
 
 
  Regular Petrol  ULSD Diesel 
 HK$/ Per litre  HK$/ Per litre a) 
Pump Price (Net) 5.07   4.67   
Product Cost (3.00)  (2.86) b) 
     
Contribution Margin in  
Dollar Amount (a) – (b) 2.07   1.81 c) 
     
Contribution Margin in  
Percentage (c) / (b) 40.83%  38.76% 
 
 
B.  Fixed Cost and Variable Costs 
The essential step of calculating contribution margin di-
vides all costs into two categories: variable costs and fixed 
costs. The difference between these two is their variations 
alongside the different level of activities. Whereas variable 
costs are directly caused by the products sold, other costs re-
main fixed. In theory, nonetheless, there are no fixed costs in 
the long run because all costs are subject to the changes of 
sales volume.94
In the case of the petroleum industry, the variable costs 
are directly influenced by each of the oil liters sold, while the 
rest of the costs remain the same.
 
95
                                                 
93 Id. 
 Land cost is generally re-
garded as a fixed cost because the rent of the petroleum station 
94 FARRISON & NOREEN, supra note 86, at 58. 
95 See id. 
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is fixed now matter the quantity of oil sold.96
                                                 
96 Id. at 57. 
 Therefore, the re-
port should not include land costs in the analysis and argue 
that high petroleum price is caused by the high land costs. 
22 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 
2:9 2011] 
 
V.  CONTRIBUTION MARGIN ANALYSIS – A TOOL FOR 
MONOPOLY MEASUREMENT 
To determine price fixing, general accounting principles 
and formulas should be considered. Despite the errors in the 
Arculli Report on the competitive circumstances of the Hong 
Kong petroleum industry, the contribution margin method is a 
useful tool. It identifies the profitability of the companies in 
comparison to the general business environment of the territo-
ry.97 The method uses the net sales revenue (i.e., gross revenue 
minor discount) so that the gross selling prices will not be mis-
leading when discounts are being offered.98 Furthermore, using 
net sales revenue better complies with the Accounting Stan-
dard than a method using gross revenue; the Accounting Stan-
dard defines revenue as “the gross inflow of economic benefits,” 
where discounts are never received by the sellers.99
A.  Legal Ground of Using the Contribution Margin  
 
Although the Arculli Report insists that high land costs are 
not the reason for the rise in oil prices,100 the existence of collu-
sion or a monopolistic position cannot be established merely by 
a high contribution margin.101
The concept of “Totality of the Facts,” which aims to take 
into consideration all relevant factors when drawing a conclu-
sion, is widely used in Business Law.
 However, an unreasonably high 
contribution margin in the same industry in comparison to oth-
er countries is still an important indicator when determining 
the competition environment of the petroleum industry in 
Hong Kong. The government does make use of contribution 
margin analysis to identify the nature of different business ac-
tivities. 
102
                                                 
97 Members' Handbook Volume II, supra note 85, ¶ 7.  
 Gross profit is obvious-
98 Yeung Wei Hon, A Few Words for the Oil Companies, WISERS, Jan. 6, 
2005, http://www.wisers.com/corpsite/global/b5/products/wisenews.html. 
99 Members' Handbook Volume II, supra note 85, ¶ 7. 
100 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 9. 
101 Id. 
102 See Comm’r of Inland Revenue v Magna Indus. Co. Ltd., [1995]. 
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ly one of the most important factors in determining the exis-
tence of unreasonably high profits. When the Inland Revenue 
Department performs field audits to detect tax evasion, profit 
margin in percentage is one of the essential elements that are 
studied because:  
cases for field audit can be said that a field audit or investigation 
is normally initiated where characteristics or indications of non-
compliance, such as the following, are present…a business has an 
unreasonably low turnover or profit percentage (having regard to 
factors such as the nature of the business, its location and type of 
customers).103
Unlike a high total profit, which may be caused by sales vo-
lume, cost control, or other non-core business activities, it is 
much more difficult to justify a high contribution margin in 
other countries where crude oil is an important sales element 
on the global market. In some circumstances, the defendant is 
expected by the prosecutor to prove his innocence against the 
finding of an unreasonably high profit. An example of this ten-
dency is found in the treatment of corruption in the Possession 
of Unexplained Property, Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of 
Hong Kong.
 
104
A high contribution margin alone is not sufficient to decide 
whether an industry or a single entity is operating as a mono-
poly. It is even more inappropriate to transfer the burden of 
proof onto the defendant because the government suggests, un-
der the Hong Kong Competition Law, that a conviction shall be 
classified as a civil matter.
 
105
                                                 
103 HONG KONG INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, supra note 90, ¶ 30. 
 Nevertheless, the contribution 
margin analysis is still a powerful tool for prosecutors to judge 
whether defendants have access to excessive privileges. Thus, if 
the court takes contribution margin as a determining factor in 
a company’s market status, the next question is how the court 
defines the reasonable scope of the margin of the defendant 
104 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, No. 201, (2008) 22 O.H.K., § 10 
(H.K.), available at: http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2-
FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/660A25EA15B8C9D6482575EE004C5BF1/$FI
LE/CAP_201_e_b5.pdf. 
105 HONG KONG INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, supra note 90, at 4. 
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against the business market as a whole. 
B.  Method for Determining Reasonable Profit 
Other methods may be used to measure the reasonability of prof-
its, but they are not as preferable as the contribution margin method, 
which identifies companies’ earnings through their activities. The 
contribution margin method shall exclude income from secondary 
items (e.g., income from items other than oil) because they are irrele-
vant to the main transaction. The contribution margin in US dollar 
amounts is not as useful, in terms of comparison to other companies, 
when it is affected by sales volume. A low contribution margin from 
selling a single unit may result in a high contribution margin when 
the sales volume is high. The contribution margin in percentage pro-
vides more insight into the profitability of the petroleum industry be-
cause it illustrates the margin in the sales unit of oil, regardless of 
the sales turnover of the company. 
C.  Contribution Margin of the Industry vs. Enterprises Listed 
in the Stock Market 
Analysts may not be able to conclude whether the contri-
bution margin percentage of a petroleum company is high 
without comparing it to other sectors. The collected data will 
therefore be compared to that of the leading companies of dif-
ferent industries in the same country because the same busi-
ness environment is necessary for an effective study. The calcu-
lation compares the contribution margin of the petroleum 
companies in Hong Kong and the United States, as an example 
demonstrated below. As the available information on diesel 
discount is limited, the study is based on the figures provided 
in the Arculli Report’s calculation of the contribution margin 
analysis in 2005.106 The figures of the other listed companies in 
Hong Kong are collected from their financial reports for the 
year ending on December 31, 2005.107
                                                 
106 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
LABOUR BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF THE HKSAR, supra note 8, at 8. 
 The financial results of 
107 The Consumer Council Provides Detailed Oil Price, YAHOO! NEWS, Feb. 
24, 2009, http://hk.wrs.yahoo.com/_ylt=A8tU3rno_O1J7C8BIJq4ygt./SIG=1-
2751gh35/EXP=1240419944/*-http%3A//hk.news.yahoo.com/article/090223/3/-
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the listed companies in the same period are not yet available, 
except for 2005; thus, this period will be used for the analysis. 
As mentioned, it is misleading to calculate a contribution mar-
gin using selling prices with taxes and duties because their 
amounts are not published separately in the data provided by 
the Consumer Council. 
The information for the United States is taken from the Oil 
and Gas Journal Database, which provides detailed figures on 
oil prices.108 The prices here also include the taxes withheld for 
the government. Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate net 
oil prices with public information because of the variability of 
taxes and duties. Of the three international oil companies 
(Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, and Chevron) listed in the 
Arculli Report,109 only Royal Dutch Shell provides sufficient da-
ta for a calculation to be performed.110
To determine whether the petrol industry in Hong Kong 
has benefited from an unusual competitive advantage, the 
study adopts a multi-dimensional comparison between the con-
tribution margin of major oil companies in Hong Kong and the 
United States to determine whether the former have higher 
profits than the latter. The study also provides information on 
the competitive environment of the oil companies in different 
geographical areas. 
 Therefore, this analysis 
adopts Shell’s industrial contribution margin and uses a simi-
lar structure to study the crude oil cost and other variable costs 
of the other petroleum companies. To ensure consistent analyt-
ical criteria, the study uses the contribution margin figures of 
the US market based on the financial reports of the companies 
listed in the Dow Jones Index for the year ending on December 
31, 2005. 
                                                                                                             
au0i.html. 
108 OGJ ONLINE RESEARCH CENTER HOME, http://ogjresearch.stores.ya-
hoo.net/price.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). 
109 HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT, STUDY OF THE AUTO-FUEL 
RETAIL MARKET, supra note 53. 
110 See generally ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, FORM 20-F ANNUAL 
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 
2005 (2006). 
26 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 
2:9 2011] 
 
D.  Assumptions and Limitations 
The analysis in this chapter is based on several assump-
tions, which are subject to the limitations outlined below 
1.  “Main Board” Only 
It is not easy to define which companies represent the gen-
eral market environment of a region, but an accepted and 
common method relies on the major index of the regional stock 
market.111 This study will adopt the Hang Seng Index and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average to represent the Hong Kong and 
United States markets, respectively. The Hang Seng Index has 
the largest pool of components valued in the Stock Exchange in 
Hong Kong112 and the thirty components of the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Average represent 27% of the float-adjusted market 
capitalization of the Dow Jones United States TSM Index, 
which provides near complete coverage of the U.S. stock mar-
ket.113
 2. Core Business Only 
 Some private companies may be larger than those listed 
on the main board, but this limitation is not taken into account 
because their financial reports might not have been published. 
Likewise, for the sake of consistency, the same standard (i.e., 
the stock market index) will be used in the analyses for all re-
gions. 
The objective of this analysis is to identify the profitability 
of the oil companies and, therefore, only the contribution mar-
gin of their core business is considered. For example, the study 
excludes the income from selling snacks in gas stations because 
this revenue is classified as food and beverage sales rather 
than petrol sales. The categorizations of core business activities 
                                                 
111 PUN-LEE LAM & SYLVIA CHAN, COMPETITION IN HONG KONG’S 
GAS INDUSTRY (2000).  
112 Fact sheet, HANG SENG INDEX, http://www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/-
static/revamp/contents/en/dl_centre/factsheets/FS_HSIe.pdf (last visit Sept. 
20, 2010). 
113 Dow Jones Industrial Average: Overview, THE DOW JONES INDEXES,  
http://www.djaverages.com/?view=industrial&page=overview (last visit Sept. 
20, 2010). 
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and principal activities are available in the director’s reports of 
the respective companies. 
 3. Geographic Listing Basic for Sampling 
A consolidated financial report, listed on the main board, is 
adopted because the necessary data from the companies for cal-
culating contribution margin are not provided in the segment 
report. This data may not be completely accurate because the 
business may earn income from outside the region (e.g., income 
from Australia earned by a component of a Hong Kong-based 
company), but they are the only data available on this issue. 
Despite this limitation, those data are preferable because most 
of the components of the “Main Board” for one region encounter 
similar situations and crises in business. 
 4. Weight Average Contribution Margin in Percentage 
The total contribution margins of the components of the 
Stock Index are calculated by their total variable cost and rev-
enue in weight average. 
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VI.  APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTION MARGIN ANALYSIS IN 
COMPETITION LAW 
A.  Comparison of Contribution Margin of Oil Industries in 
Hong Kong and the US 
There are four figures in the model that are worth hig-
hlighting, see Table 6.1: 
 
Table 6.1 - The Three-Dimensional Model for Contribu-
tion Margin Analysis, of the Oil Companies and Major 
Enterprises in Hong Kong and US 
 
The CM of major Oil 
Companies in Hong 
Kong – a 
 The CM of major Oil 
Companies in the 
US - b 
   
The CM of Major En-
terprises in Hong Kong 
(Hang Seng Index) - c 
 The CM of Major 
Enterprises in US 
(Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average) - d 
 
a - The contribution margin of the oil companies in Hong Kong 
– based on the data provided by Arculli & Associates. 114
b - The contribution margin of the oil companies in US – based 
on that of the Royal Dutch Shell, for the reason stated. 
  
115
c - The contribution margin of the enterprises in Hong Kong. 
  
116
                                                 
114 See infra Part 6.1.1. 
  
115 See infra Part 6.1.2. 
116 See infra Part 6.1.3. 
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d - The contribution margin of the enterprises in US. 117
 
 
 1. The Contribution Margin of the Oil Companies in Hong 
Kong 
As indicated in Table 4.2, the contribution margin of regu-
lar petrol and ULSD Diesel sold in Hong Kong are 40.83% and 
38.76% respectively. As there is no available information on 
collective sales volume, the following analysis will apply the 
contribution margin to each product separately. 
 2. The Contribution Margin of the Oil Companies in US 
The variable costs and sales revenue of Royal Dutch Shell 
in 2005 are USD 48.24 and 67.48 respectively.118
 3. The Contribution Margin of the Enterprises in Hong 
Kong 
 The contribu-
tion margin in percentage is (USD 67.48 – USD 48.24) / USD 
67.48 = 28.51%. Unlike in Hong Kong, there is no division be-
tween regular petrol and ULSD Diesel in the US. 
The weight average contribution margin of all components 
listed in the Hang Seng Index on December 31, 2005 is 
54.05%.119
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 See infra Part 6.1.4. 
118 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, supra note 110, at 48, 54. 
119 See infra Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 - The Contribution Margin of the Listed Companies of Hong Kong Hang Seng Index on 31 Dec 
2005, For the Year Ended 2005120
A 
 
B C D E F G H I 
Company Name 
Cod
e 
Turnover Variable Costs 
Contribution Mar-
gin 
CM as 
Percen-
tage 
Exchange 
Rate Fac-
tor 
Turnover in HKD CM in HKD 
Cheung Kong 
(Holdings) Limited 
1 HK$14,358,000,000  HK$4,961,000,000  HK$9,397,000,000  65.45% 1.000000  HK$14,358,000,000  HK$9,397,000,000  
CLP Group 2 HK$38,584,000,000  HK$21,516,000,000  HK$17,068,000,000  44.24% 1.000000  HK$38,584,000,000  HK$17,068,000,000  
HK & China Gas 
Ltd. 
3 HK$9,350,900,000  HK$6,036,100,000  HK$3,314,800,000  35.45% 1.000000  HK$9,350,900,000  HK$3,314,800,000  
The Wharf  
(Holdings) Limited 
4 HK$12,543,000,000  HK$4,201,000,000  HK$8,342,000,000  66.51% 1.000000  HK$12,543,000,000  HK$8,342,000,000  
                                                 
120 See Annual Reports for the year ended 2005 of the companies listed in the table. 
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HSBC 5 US$60,094,000,000  US$28,760,000,000  US$31,334,000,000  52.14% 7.767900  HK$466,804,182,600  
HK$243,399,378,60
0  
Hongkong Electric 
Holdings Limited 
6 HK$11,622,000,000  HK$4,038,000,000  HK$7,584,000,000  65.26% 1.000000  HK$11,622,000,000  HK$7,584,000,000  
PCCW 8 HK$22,499,000,000  HK$10,467,000,000  HK$12,032,000,000  53.48% 1.000000  HK$22,499,000,000  HK$12,032,000,000  
Hang Seng Bank 11 HK$19,029,000,000  HK$7,961,000,000  HK$11,068,000,000  58.16% 1.000000  HK$19,029,000,000  HK$11,068,000,000  
Henderson Law De-
velopment 
12 HK$5,833,300,000  HK$2,933,200,000  HK$2,900,100,000  49.72% 1.000000  HK$5,833,300,000  HK$2,900,100,000  
Hutchison Wham-
poa Limited 
13 
HK$182,584,000,00
0  
HK$62,804,000,000  
HK$119,780,000,00
0  
65.60% 1.000000  HK$182,584,000,000  
HK$119,780,000,00
0  
Sun Hung Kai 
Properties Ltd 
16 HK$22,945,000,000  HK$13,351,000,000  HK$9,594,000,000  41.81% 1.000000  HK$22,945,000,000  HK$9,594,000,000  
New World Devel-
opment Company 
Limited 
17 HK$22,270,800,000  HK$17,229,900,000  HK$5,040,900,000  22.63% 1.000000  HK$22,270,800,000  HK$5,040,900,000  
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Swire Pacific A 19 HK$18,937,000,000  HK$10,755,000,000  HK$8,182,000,000  43.21% 1.000000  HK$18,937,000,000  HK$8,182,000,000  
Bank of East Asia 23 HK$7,806,534,000  HK$4,046,276,000  HK$3,760,258,000  48.17% 1.000000  HK$7,806,534,000  HK$3,760,258,000  
Mass Transit Rail-
way 
66 HK$9,153,000,000  HK$4,052,000,000  HK$5,101,000,000  55.73% 1.000000  HK$9,153,000,000  HK$5,101,000,000  
Sino Group 83 HK$4,150,741,802  HK$2,078,945,025  HK$2,071,796,777  49.91% 1.000000  HK$4,150,741,802  HK$2,071,796,777  
Hang Lung Proper-
ties 
101 HK$6,955,300,000  HK$3,505,500,000  HK$3,449,800,000  49.60% 1.000000  HK$6,955,300,000  HK$3,449,800,000  
China Merchants 
Holdings (Interna-
tional) 
144 HK$2,972,000,000  HK$2,147,000,000  HK$825,000,000  27.76% 1.000000  HK$2,972,000,000  HK$825,000,000  
Johnson Elec H 179 US$1,143,783,000  US$795,625,000  US$348,158,000  30.44% 7.767900  HK$8,884,791,966  HK$2,704,456,528  
Denway Motors 203 HK$850,483,000  HK$754,813,000  HK$95,670,000  11.25% 1.000000  HK$850,483,000  HK$95,670,000  
CITIC Pacific Ltd 267 HK$26,564,000,000  HK$21,226,000,000  HK$5,338,000,000  20.09% 1.000000  HK$26,564,000,000  HK$5,338,000,000  
China Resources 291 HK$53,583,919,000  HK$44,439,151,000  HK$9,144,768,000  17.07% 1.000000  HK$53,583,919,000  HK$9,144,768,000  
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Enterprise 
Cathay Pacific 293 HK$50,909,000,000  HK$46,766,000,000  HK$4,143,000,000  8.14% 1.000000  HK$50,909,000,000  HK$4,143,000,000  
Esprit Holdings Li-
mited 
330 HK$20,631,815,000  HK$9,412,770,000  HK$11,219,045,000  54.38% 1.000000  HK$20,631,815,000  HK$11,219,045,000  
Li & Fung Group 494 HK$55,617,374,000  HK$49,956,433,000  HK$5,660,941,000  10.18% 1.000000  HK$55,617,374,000  HK$5,660,941,000  
Yue Yuen Industrial 
(Holding) Ltd 
551 
US$3,154,835,000.0
0  
US$2,427,728,000.0
0  
US$727,107,000.00  23.05% 7.767900  HK$24,506,442,797  HK$5,648,094,465  
China Unicom 762 ￥87,048,831,000.00  ￥17,119,687,000  ￥69,929,144,000  80.33% 1.053141  HK$82,656,387,891  HK$66,400,552,253  
China National Off-
shore Oil 
883 ￥53,417,669,000  ￥5,934,598,000  ￥47,483,071,000  88.89% 1.053141  HK$50,722,238,523  HK$45,087,097,549  
China Mobile 941 ￥181,765,000,000  ￥18,533,000,000  ￥163,232,000,000  89.80% 1.053141  HK$172,593,223,509  
HK$154,995,389,98
1  
Lenovo Group 992 HK$22,554,678,000  HK$21,381,062,000  HK$1,173,616,000  5.20% 1.000000  HK$22,554,678,000  HK$1,173,616,000  
CKI Holdings 1038 HK$2,247,000,000  HK$1,729,000,000  HK$518,000,000  23.05% 1.000000  HK$2,247,000,000  HK$518,000,000  
Cosco Pacific 1199 US$295,648,000.00  US$115,551,000.00  US$180,097,000.00  60.92% 7.767900  HK$2,296,564,099  HK$1,398,975,486  
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Bank of China (HK) 2388 HK$25,875,000,000  HK$13,001,000,000  HK$12,874,000,000  49.75% 1.000000  HK$25,875,000,000  HK$12,874,000,000  
       
HK$ 
1,478,890,676,187 
HK$ 
761,627,639,640 
       (a) (b) 
       = (b)/(a) 54.05% 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. The Contribution Margin of the Enterprises in the United States 
The weight average contribution margin of all components listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on Decem-
ber 31, 2005 is 37.92%.121
 
 
Table 6.3 - The Contribution Margin of the Listed Companies of the US Dow Jones Index on 31 Dec 2005, 
                                                 
121 See infra Table 6.3. 
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For the Year Ended 2005122
 
 
A B C D E F 
Company Name Code Turnover Variable Costs Contribution Margin 
CM as 
Percentage 
3M MMM US$21,167,000,000  US$10,408,000,000  US$10,759,000,000  50.83% 
AIG AIG US$108,905,000,000  US$93,692,000,000  US$15,213,000,000  13.97% 
Alcoa Inc AA US$26,159,000,000  US$21,217,000,000  US$4,942,000,000  18.89% 
Altria Group MO US$97,854,000,000  US$36,764,000,000  US$61,090,000,000  62.43% 
American Express AXP US$24,267,000,000  US$5,841,000,000  US$18,426,000,000  75.93% 
AT&T T US$43,862,000,000  US$37,694,000,000  US$6,168,000,000  14.06% 
Boeing BA US$54,845,000,000  US$45,849,000,000  US$8,996,000,000  16.40% 
Caterpillar Inc CAT US$34,006,000,000  US$26,558,000,000  US$7,448,000,000  21.90% 
Citigroup C US$120,318,000,000  US$36,676,000,000  US$83,642,000,000  69.52% 
                                                 
122 See Annual Reports for the year ended 2005 of the companies listed in the table. 
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Coca Cola KO US$23,104,000,000  US$8,195,000,000  US$14,909,000,000  64.53% 
DuPont DD US$26,639,000,000  US$19,701,000,000  US$6,938,000,000  26.04% 
Exxon Mobil XOM US$358,955,000,000  US$212,038,000,000  US$146,917,000,000  40.93% 
General Electric GE US$92,589,000,000  US$66,814,000,000  US$25,775,000,000  27.84% 
General Motors GM US$192,604,000,000  US$171,033,000,000  US$21,571,000,000  11.20% 
Hewlett Packard HPQ US$86,325,000,000  US$66,224,000,000  US$20,101,000,000  23.29% 
Home Depot HD US$81,511,000,000  US$54,191,000,000  US$27,320,000,000  33.52% 
Honeywell HON US$27,653,000,000  US$21,465,000,000  US$6,188,000,000  22.38% 
IBM IBM US$91,134,000,000  US$54,602,000,000  US$36,532,000,000  40.09% 
Intel Corporation INTC US$38,826,000,000  US$15,777,000,000  US$23,049,000,000  59.36% 
Johnson and Johnson JNJ US$50,514,000,000  US$13,954,000,000  US$36,560,000,000  72.38% 
JP Morgan Chase JPM US$45,200,000,000  US$25,369,000,000  US$19,831,000,000  43.87% 
McDonalds MCD US$20,460,000,000  US$14,135,000,000  US$6,325,000,000  30.91% 
Merck Com MRK US$22,011,900,000  US$5,149,600,000  US$16,862,300,000  76.61% 
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Microsoft MSFT US$39,788,000,000  US$6,200,000,000  US$33,588,000,000  84.42% 
Pfizer PFE US$51,298,000,000  US$8,525,000,000  US$42,773,000,000  83.38% 
Procter Gamble PG US$56,741,000,000  US$27,804,000,000  US$28,937,000,000  51.00% 
United Tech UTX US$42,278,000,000  US$30,935,000,000  US$11,343,000,000  26.83% 
Verizon Commun VZ US$75,112,000,000  US$25,469,000,000  US$49,643,000,000  66.09% 
Wal Mart WMT US$285,222,000,000  US$219,793,000,000  US$65,429,000,000  22.94% 
Walt Disney DIS US$31,944,000,000  US$27,837,000,000  US$4,107,000,000  12.86% 
  
US$ 
2,271,291,900,000  
 
US$ 
861,382,300,000  
 
  (a)  (b)  
   = (b)/(a) 37.92%  
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A.  Analysis 
 1. The Contribution Margins 
The required figures are in Table 6.4 and 6.5: 
 
Table 6.4 - Contribution Margin Analysis when Regular 
Petrol is Used123
 
 
a 40.83% b 28.51% 
c 54.05% d 37.92% 
a / c 75.54% b / d 75.18% 
 
Table 6.5 - Contribution Margin Analysis when ULSD 
Diesel is Used124
 
 
a 38.76% b 28.51% 
c 54.05% d 37.92% 
a / c 71.71% b / d 75.18% 
 
Based on Table 6.4 and 6.5, it is clear that the contribution 
margins of petroleum companies in Hong Kong - 40.83% (Regu-
lar Petrol) and 38.76% (ULSD) - are significantly higher than 
the US equivalent, 28.51%.However, a different conclusion may 
be reached when the contribution margin of the petrol industry 
is compared to that of the general market. The contribution 
margins of Regular Petrol and ULSD sold in Hong Kong (as 
listed in the Hong Kong stock market) are only 75.54% and 
71.71% respectively. The equivalent figure in the US is 75.18%, 
which is in the same level.  
 
 2. Is Contribution Margin of Hong Kong Oil Companies 
                                                 
123 See supra note 114-117 and accompanying text. 
124 Id. 
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Too High? 
As emphasized above, it is too arbitrary to conclude that 
the Hong Kong petroleum companies enjoy monopoly simply 
because of their high contribution margin. However, when the 
court considers the “totality of the facts”, contribution margin 
shall still be one of the most important concerns. Thanks to the 
high cost of land in Hong Kong, the petroleum companies could 
expect to earn more from the same activity than in another 
country. Nevertheless, the Arculli Report still fails to justify 
the high contribution margin of the petroleum companies in 
Hong Kong over other large enterprises in the same region, 
provided that they all operate in the same business environ-
ment, the logic which has been rebutted by David Ricardo.125
For the reasons given above, the court has every right to 
ask the petroleum companies to justify their high contribution 
margin with reasons other than the factor of land price that is 
described in the Arculli Report. This inquiry should determine 
whether the companies are violating the future competition 
law. Again, the multi-dimensional model here provides a possi-
ble answer to the unreasonably high contribution margin of 
some Hong Kong companies, an imbalance that could also 
prove to be the reason behind high land costs in the city.  
 It 
is also unclear why such a high contribution margin does not 
exist in the United States. 
 3. The Legal Application on the Contribution Margin 
Companies may argue that, when it comes to applying an-
ti-trust law, the contribution margin test will increase both 
their operational costs and the price of reviewing their statuses 
on the monopoly issue. Nevertheless, this test will obviate the 
need of corporations to defend themselves against charges of 
anti-trust behaviors. 
Shenefield John and Stelzer Irwin suggest that companies 
                                                 
125 DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION, ch. 2 (3d ed. 1821), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/-
Ricardo/ricP.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
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should perform periodic audits specifically aimed at issues of 
antitrust behaviors.126 They also point out that lawyers should 
conduct the examination to avoid accusations of “privilege.”127 
As the authors note, antitrust law has become “a fact of life in 
American business” and regular reviews are, therefore, neces-
sary.128
In fact, the performance of periodic statutory audits under 
regulation is not overly costly in the current business environ-
ment. In Hong Kong, all limited companies have to be audited 
upon submitting their financial statements to the Inland Reve-
nue Department.
 Additionally, accountants should be involved in this 
process because accounting principles are generally accepted 
not only by accountants, but also by legal experts and the gen-
eral public. 
129
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Furthermore, the data provided by the 
companies is accepted by professional accountants as well as 
government institutions. Guaranteed by third parties removed 
from the legal proceedings, data provides companies with a 
means of self-defense and a just method to test whether they 
risk violating anti-trust laws 
A fair and objective test of corporations’ monopolistic pow-
er is vital to develop anti-trust legislation that protects the 
public without impairing commercial activity. Although the Ar-
culli Report is a viable model with which to test a per se viola-
tion of the competition law, in reality, it is very difficult for the 
courts to apply this model because it is almost impossible to 
prove the existence of price fixing between large corporations. 
This article provides an alternative method that uses systemat-
ic and reliable accounting knowledge and formulae. If the com-
petition law is enacted in Hong Kong in the near future, it will 
be for the courts to determine whether a company or industry 
is acting as a monopoly.  
                                                 
126 JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS, A PRIMER 143-44 (4th ed. 2001). 
127 Id. at 143. 
128 Id. at 144. 
129 See Profits Tax Return – Corporations (Form BIR51), INLAND REVENUE 
DEPT., http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/ebir51.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
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As it was emphasized in this article, a high contribution 
margin does not perfectly indicate a violation of anti-trust law, 
but it is a good starting point for the courts to examine the de-
fendant’s monopolistic power. Judges can use this test to 
measure the degree of monopoly objectively. Due to the limited 
information available from some industries, the courts can en-
sure a more accurate test by demanding that the concerned 
business parties provide more data and information (e.g., the 
contribution margin of all single items). It also ensures that 
companies will have a built-in defense against charges of mo-
nopoly when they provide data for this test. This requirement 
perfects the model and will ultimately establish a solid founda-
tion upon which to enforce anti-trust law. 
 
